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Abstract  
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1. Introduction 
The liberalization wave of the 1990s has reshaped the economic landscape of a majority of 
developing countries around the world. The most notable global change during this period has been 
the radical surge in the frequency and magnitude of financial transactions vis-à-vis goods markets as 
reflected in the skyrocketing daily foreign exchange (FX) trading that amounted to 1.9 trillion dollars 
in 2004 with an increasing gap between real and financial sector activities (BIS, 2004). Accordingly, 
annual FX trading to world trade ratio has significantly increased from 2/1 in 1973 up to 90/1 in 
2004, while FX trading to World GDP ratio has reached 17/1 as of 2004 (BIS 2004; WDI).  
In this respect, the impacts of financial liberalization and ensuing macro and microeconomic 
changes on the real sectors of the economy have been an attractive yet unresolved topic for the last 
two decades. In this debate, a consistently popular field of research has been the effects of financial 
liberalization on capital market imperfections and real sector investment performance.  Accordingly, 
given the presence of capital market imperfections (that is exposed by the significance of the 
availability of internal funds in new investment decisions), financial liberalization was seen as a way 
of correcting such distortions and eliminating any hierarchy of finance.  
In contrast, potential negative effects of financial liberalization have also been highlighted in 
the recent literature.  In particular, the financialization view has questioned the allocative efficiency 
arguments of financial liberalization by pointing out the portfolio allocation problem faced by real 
sector firms between fixed and financial investments. According to this view, increasing volatility 
and uncertainty in macro and microeconomic environment, increasing real interest rates and lack of 
credit availability, and increasing product market competition when combined with the availability of 
higher rates of return in the financial markets may hinder real investments while favoring short-term 
financial investments (see. Crotty 2005; Dumenil and Levy 2005; Epstein and Jayadev 2005). In this 
respect, the so-called financialization of real sectors is seen as one of the reasons behind the 
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disappointingly low fixed capital formation rates in emerging markets during the 1990s (Unctad 
2003).  
The central motivation of this paper is to combine these two views of financial liberalization 
to answer the following question: given capital market imperfections, do internal funds, regardless of 
their origin, have a uniform effect on new fixed investment spending in the presence of investment 
opportunities in both real and financial sectors of the economy? In this respect, the article revisits the 
findings of previous research on the relationship between cash flow and private investment under 
credit constraints, at least in the case of developing countries after financial liberalization, by 
suggesting that availability of internal funds may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
financing real investment projects. Accordingly, profits from fixed and financial assets as well as 
their respective rates of returns may have different effects on new fixed investment decisions. The 
main contention here is that if the real sector firms face these two types of investments, then their 
portfolio allocation decisions will depend on both the cash flow and respective rates of returns.  
On the other hand, even if the financialization view is correct, this may not necessarily reflect 
a negative development for real sector firms in the long run. Accordingly, given that rate of return on 
financial assets is an increasing function of risk, real sector firms may choose to exploit such 
investments to hedge against uncertainties regarding its operations and fixed investment projects as 
suggested by the standard portfolio theory of capital.  As a result, financial investments may have a 
positive impact on the overall profitability of private firms and therefore on new fixed investment 
spending under credit constraints.  
Given the lack of micro-level analysis of developing country experiences, the above 
hypothesis is tested using the evidence from two major emerging markets, namely Mexico, and 
Turkey. The dataset we employed is unique and can be expected to advance the existing debate by 
enabling in-depth testing of the hypothesis above. Briefly, we developed a highly detailed bi-annual 
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panel of all publicly traded industrial firms in Mexico and Turkey using firm level balance-sheet and 
income statement data for each country separately.  
The empirical results based on Euler equation approach and the insights of a simplified 
portfolio choice model provide support to the main hypothesis while identifying certain differences 
between Mexico and Turkey.  Briefly, in both cases we found that capital market imperfections 
continue to persist under financial liberalization. More importantly, the results challenged the 
findings of previous research on cash flow/private investment relationship. We discovered that 
financial and operational profits have quite different effects on private fixed investment spending. 
Financial profits also appeared to provide a hedging mechanism by providing cash flow in the 
subsequent periods. In both Mexico and Turkey, however, the positive effect seemed to be much 
weaker than the one from operational profits. The overall effect of cash flow from financial 
investments is actually negative in the case of Mexico and even though it is positive in Turkey, the 
economic effect of such profits is significantly smaller than those from operational activities. We also 
examined the effect of rates of returns from fixed and financial investments and have found similar 
results in both cases. Furthermore, comparing differential impacts of cash flow on small and large 
firms, we found that large firms faced an increasing credit squeeze during the 1990s. More 
interestingly, unlike large firms our findings indicate a positive effect of financial profits on fixed 
investment spending of small firms in both countries.      
The paper is organized as follows: next two sections presents a brief review of the literature 
on the effects of financing constraints as well as of financial liberalization on investment and capital 
market imperfections. The fourth section introduces the theoretical model.  The fifth section 
introduces the data, methodology and estimation methods. The sixth section presents the main 
results. The final section concludes the paper.   
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2. Capital Market Imperfections and Private Investment 
Under the assumption of perfect capital markets, Modigliani and Miller (1958) suggested that 
financing decisions or capital structure of firms should not have any impact on private investment 
spending since firms are to have equal and unlimited access to investment finance at an exogenously 
determined cost.  Instead, cost of capital given by the market should be the only determinant.  In 
retrospect, the significance of this conclusion was that under these assumptions the importance of 
liquidity variables such as profits or cash flow disappeared unless they signaled future profitability. 
However, the empirical findings suggested otherwise by pointing out liquidity variables such as cash 
flow as significant determinants of fixed investment spending (e.g. Bond and Meghir 1994; Devereux 
and Schianterelli 1990; Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen  1988; Hayashi and Inoue 1991; Mairesse, 
Hall, and Mulkay 1999).  
The apparent conflict between theory and empirical evidence led to the development of a new 
generation of research that offered a resolution to the above puzzle. Accordingly, under the presence 
of capital market imperfections private firm investments may be constrained by the availability of 
internal funds (for a review see Blundell, Bond, and Meghir 1996; Hubbard 1998).  For example, in 
the case of hierarchy of finance approach firms are not indifferent between internal and external 
sources of funds since internally generated funds cost less than external ones to finance investment 
expenditures (Bond and Meghir 1994).  Moreover, in the presence of asymmetric information 
between investors and firms or of agency costs, external finance may be more costly than internal 
sources (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Myers and Majluf 1984; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). 
Given the presence of capital market imperfections, therefore, financial liberalization was 
expected to generate capital market deepening, reduce agency costs and asymmetric information, 
eliminate rent-seeking caused by directed and subsidized credit programs, and increase efficiency 
while directing limited resources to more efficient investment projects at lower costs.  Yet, on purely 
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theoretical grounds the effect of financial liberalization on total pool of loanable funds is ambiguous. 
Initially, its effect on increasing household savings was seen as one of the key components of the 
reform programs (McKinnon 1973; Shaw 1973).    However, financial liberalization might indeed 
negatively affect savings, first by decreasing total amount of precautionary savings as a result of 
increased risk sharing across international capital markets (Devereux and Smith 1994).  Secondly, 
when financial liberalization includes capital account liberalization there is no guarantee that capital 
inflows will outweigh outflows by residents.   Thirdly, the degree of ex-post credit availability is 
partly constrained by the after-liberalization interest rate, which depends on its previous level under 
autarky (Henry 2000, p.304).  
Regarding the net effect of financial liberalization on efficient allocation of loanable funds, 
there is also some ambiguity. Given that financial liberalization is expected to increase total funds 
available for more risky investment projects, it may negatively affect the banking sector portfolios by 
encouraging credits to more risky borrowers. According to IMF (1995) this was exactly the reason 
behind the increase in non-performing loans in the banking sector in Mexico during the course of 
1990s. 
On the empirical side of the picture, despite the findings of Mairesse, Hall, and Mulkay 
(1999), which argued that the impact of profits on investment decreased in the US and France as a 
result of deregulation of financial markets during the 80s, there are serious doubts on the success 
liberalization programs in the case of developing countries. For instance, Laeven (2003) for 13 
developing countries and Gelos and Werner (2002) for Mexico found that financial liberalization 
affected small and large firms differently by releasing financial constraints for the former and 
increasing for the latter. Likewise, the existing empirical research failed to uncover any robust 
evidence of efficiency gains in the financial sectors. In this respect, there are also some questions 
over the contribution of foreign banks to the capital accumulation and financial stability. Peek and 
Rosengren, (2000), for example, showed that the increased share of total claims attributable to 
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foreign banks in Latin America came at the expense of domestically owned private banks. Similarly, 
Goldberg, Dages, and Kinney (2000) found little difference between domestic and foreign owned 
banks’ loan behavior and the composition of loan portfolios in Argentina.1   
In the case of both Mexico and Turkey, private firms still continue to face strict credit 
rationing and are forced to finance fixed investment projects mostly from internal sources and short-
term borrowing (EIU 2003a, p. 8, 13; 2003b, p. 37). For example, as of 2005 the share of short-term 
debt in total debt of top 500 manufacturing firms in Turkey was around 70% (ISO). Furthermore, 
total bank credit to the private sector as a share of GDP in both Mexico and Turkey has been 
depressingly low: the ratio was 15% and 18% in 1980-89, 25% and 20% in 1990-99, and 16% and 
20% in 2000-2005 respectively, which are well below the high income OECD average of over 160%.  
Regarding capital market deepening, the scoreboard of last two decades is also disappointing. 
During this period several Latin American countries (especially Mexico) have developed money 
markets mostly in short-term government papers, while capital markets in private securities 
remained underdeveloped (Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod 1996). Similarly, as of 2004 around 98% 
of secondary market transactions were of government securities in Turkey with an average of 
88% during the course of 1990s (SPK 2004).  The existing evidence also suggests an increase in 
the volatility of stock markets, which were expected to be more stable and become a reliable 
source of financing after financial liberalization (Grabel 1995; Wei and Zhang 2006).  
3. Increasing Risk, Volatility and Fixed Investment Performance 
Following financial liberalization, there have also been substantial changes in the financial 
sector behaviour and key macro prices. The growth volatility, for example, has declined across 
developed countries (McConnell and Perez-Quiros 2000). The results, however, are not uniform in 
developing countries.  Montiel and Serven (2004) reported a decline in the per capita GDP growth 
                                                 
1
 For a discussion see Moreno and Villar (2005). 
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volatility in developing countries from 4% in the 1970s and 1980s to about 3% in the 1990s, which even 
then remained well above the 1.5% average of developed countries. They also reported that the reduction 
in volatility was not uniform and one third of 77 countries analyzed did actually see an increase in growth 
volatility during the 1990s. Similarly, Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2003) found an increase in 
consumption volatility in emerging markets during the 1990s. Furthermore, Gabriele, Boratav, and 
Parikh (2000, p.1051) pointed out the ‘high, rising and unpredictable” volatility of capital flows to 
developing countries during the 1990s compared to late 70s and 80s. Regarding microeconomic 
uncertainty and volatility, we see similar changes in both developed and developing economies. 
Comin and Mulani (2006) and Wei and Zhang (2006) for the US, and Thesmar and Thoenig (2004) 
for France discovered an increase in sales and earnings volatility of publicly listed firms for the last 
three decades. 
When looking at the impacts of uncertainty and instability in macroeconomic environment, 
Aizenman and Marion (1999), Hausmann and Gavin (1995) and Serven (1998) found a negative 
relationship between private investment and several economic instability measures in developing 
countries. In addition, real exchange rate instability is found to have a both economically and 
statistically significant negative effect on investment and growth in both developed and developing 
countries (Driver and Moreton 1991; Edwards 1989; Federer 1993; Pindyck and Solimano 1993).  
In this picture, we argue that increasing uncertainty and volatility when combined with 
persistent capital market imperfections and booming financial markets with large spreads between 
rates of return on financial and real sector activities leads to the financialization syndrome among 
real sector firms as the investors shorten their time horizons either to benefit from speculative gains 
or to avoid excess risk. As a result, increasing macro volatility and rising rates of returns in the 
financial markets may lead to a slow down of investment in the real sectors while favoring those in 
the financial sectors. In order to compare the profitability of financial investments, we looked at the 
average rate of return in the financial markets using the net arbitrage gain as a proxy (calculated 
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using the uncovered interest parity condition as the difference between domestic monthly T-bill rates 
deflated by the next period average depreciation of domestic currency, and the US T-bill rate)2. 
Accordingly, the financial return arbitrage has increased from negative numbers during pre-liberalization 
era to as high as 42% and 82% on average in Mexico in 1995 and  in Turkey in 2003 respectively with a 
maximum of 259% in March 1995 in Mexico and 466% in May 1994 in Turkey. The annual average 
between 1990 and 2005 has been 11.5% and 22% respectively. The real interest rates also remained very 
high in international standards at 4.5% and 10.5% on average between 1990-2005 with a peak at 9.5% in 
1999 and 25% in 2002 in Mexico and Turkey respectively.  
The existing empirical evidence also suggests the presence of such a structural change in real 
sectors. In the case of the US, for example, the ratio of profits of financial corporations to those of 
non-financial corporations (NFC) rose from around 15% in the early 50s and 60s to around 50% in 
2001 (Crotty 2005, p.85). During this period, the ratio of NFC portfolio income to cash flow also 
rose from around 14% in 1960s to around 37% towards the end of 90s in the US (Crotty 2005, 
p.107).  In the case of increasing cost of external financing, Dumenil and Levy (2005) estimated that 
in France about 2.4% points of profits were lost due to interest payments from the mid 1980s and 
1.7% in the US. Likewise, Epstein and Jayadev (2005) estimated that the income share of firms 
engaged primarily in financial activities has risen over and above that of non-financial sector 
averages in all OECD countries between 1960s and 1970s, and 1990s.  In the case of Turkey, the 
share of financial revenues in overall profits of top 500 manufacturing firms jumped up to 547% in 
2001 from around 15% in 1982 (ISO).  During this period the average ratio increased from around 
23% between 1982 and 1989 (pre-liberalization period) to around 112% between 1990-2002 (post-
liberalization period). We also see a sharp decline in the median profit margins (defined by operating 
                                                 
2
 That is *)1()]1/()1[(
^
RER +−++ where R is 3-month domestic T-bill rate, 
^
E  is average 
depreciation of domestic currency against U.S. dollar, R* is 3-month US T-bill rate. 
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profit to net sales ratio) of Mexican and Turkish firms in our dataset from 13 and 20 percent during 
early and mid 1990s to around 8% and 4% in 2003 respectively (Figure 1).  
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
Using our dataset, we also examined the changes in the volatility of operational profits in 
Mexico and Turkey and compared them with the changes in the share of financial investments in the 
asset structure of firms. We found some evidence of hedging motive behind firms’ portfolio 
diversification decisions between fixed and financial assets. The simple correlation and covariance of 
volatility of operating profits and the share of financial assets in total assets is found to be positive. 
Furthermore, Figure 1 below also supports the view that increasing uncertainty regarding cash flow 
from real sector activities may encourage more financial investments.  
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
Thus, we argue that in order to diminish the debt burden and declining rates of return vis-à-
vis financial sectors real sector firms have invested in financial assets.  The positive relationship 
between operating profits volatility and financial investments also suggest the presence of hedging 
motivations in investment decisions. The covariance between rates of returns on fixed and financial 
assets also lends some support to this view. Accordingly, we found a very low yet positive 
covariance between these two rates of returns in Mexico (0.03). It is however, negative in the case of 
Turkey (-0.26) as would be expected under the portfolio theory of capital.  
The overall picture of Mexican and Turkish economies during the 1990s is also consistent 
with the insights of financialization view. During this period, despite booming financial markets both 
countries experienced comparatively low growth rates and steadily declining fixed capital formation 
in the economy that led Unctad (2003) to include them in the group of deindustrilizers among other 
emerging markets. While the gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP fell from an 
average of 21% to 19% between 1980-89 and 2000-05 in Mexico, it stayed at the same level of 22% 
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in Turkey.  These rates are well below the 25% minimum that Unctad (2003, p.61) identified as the 
required threshold to generate high and sustained growth in middle-income developing countries. 
4. Theoretical Framework: The Euler equation and portfolio choice model 
In order to test the capital market imperfections and financialization hypothesis (more on this 
later) we adopt the Euler model of investment, which allows for financial frictions and is closely 
based on Bond and Meghir (1994) and Laeven (2003).3 As discussed by Blundell, Bond, and Meghir 
(1992), Bond and Van Reenen (1999) and Laeven (2003) Euler equation approach has a number 
advantages over other methods such as the q-model of investment or the Abel and Blanchard (1986) 
model. Accordingly, the Euler model (as developed by Abel 1980) avoids the use of share price data 
and “the economic structure characterizing the investment decision may be investigated without 
imposing the auxiliary assumptions that have been used to measure the shadow value of capital” as is 
the case in the q-model or Abel and Blanchard (1986) (Blundell, Bond, and Meghir 1992, p. 399). 
For simplicity, any bankruptcy costs and taxes, which were initially included in Bond and Meghir 
(1994) are excluded.  
We assume that firm’s main target is to maximize its present value (Vt) (which is equal to 
expected value of future dividends) subject to capital accumulation and external borrowing 
constraints. We incorporate financial frictions by assuming that debt is the marginal source of 
external finance and risk-neutral debt holders demand an external finance premium, η t= η(Bt) where 
0/ >∂∂ Bη  due to agency costs and asymmetric information, which forces heavily indebted firms to 
pay an increasing premium on their borrowing. The gross required rate of return on debt is assumed 
to be equal (1+rt)(1+η (Bt)), where rt is the riskless rate of return and given our assumption of risk 
neutral share holders, it is equal to the interest rate on default-free bonds and is given exogenously to 
                                                 
3
 For a review of econometric modeling of company investment see Blundell, Bond, and Meghir 
(1992).  
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the firm.4 Also a nonnegativeity constraint is enforced on dividends in order to have debt rather than 
equity to be the firm’s marginal source of finance (i.e. )0≥tD . The advantage of this modification is 
that the optimal path for investment remains unaffected by the introduction of debt finance into the 
model and makes it unnecessary to make any assumptions about the firm’s optimal borrowing policy.    
The profit function is then given by Πt= Π (Kt, Lt, It), where Lt is a vector of variable inputs 
and It is the gross investment at time t. The owner of the firm then tries to maximize (E is the 
expectations operator): 
∑
∞
=
++=
0
][
J
Jt
t
Jttt DEV β            (1) 
where ∏
=
−++ +=
J
i
it
t
Jt r
1
1 )1/(1β  for ,1≥j  and 111 =β  
subject to: 
111 ))(1)(1( −−− ++−+Π= tttttt BBrBD η         (2) 
ttt IKK +−= −1)1( δ            (3) 
0≥tD             (4) 
Substituting (2) into (1) for Dt and eliminating It from Πt( ) by using (3), we get the following 
maximization problem for capital Kt : 
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where λt+j is the shadow cost of internal funds (i.e. non-negativity constraint on dividends). The first 
order condition (foc) for Kt then gives:   
                                                 
4
 We simplify the model by assuming that the discount factor, rt is constant over time and across 
firms as in Bond and Meghir (1994), Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), and Leaven (2003).  
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which shows that marginal cost of external borrowing determines the relationship between the 
shadow value of internal finance at time t and t+1.  
As long as Dt  > 0, the firm’s net revenues are large enough to finance its investment from its 
retained earnings and pay positive dividends at the same time. Under this assumption, the shadow 
value of internal finance, λt, is zero and (5a) becomes: 
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In order to obtain an empirical model of investment, the net revenue function is specified as: 
t
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homogenous in investment and capital and is strictly convex in investment. F(K, L) is a constant 
returns to scale production function, pt is the price of firm’s output, wt is the vector prices of the 
variable inputs Lt,, and ptI is the price of investment goods. To allow for imperfect competition pt is 
assumed to depend on net output, Yt, with the price elasticity of demand, ε, assumed constant and ε  > 
1. 
Given that pt depends on output Y (Kt, Lt, It) = F(Kt, Lt) - G(It, Kt), we differentiate (8) with 
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where α = 1 - (1/ε) > 1 
Similarly,  












∂
∂
−





∂
∂
=











∂
∂
−





∂
∂






−=





∂
∏∂
tt
t
tt
t
t K
G
K
Fp
K
G
K
Fp
K
α
ε
11      (10) 
Given 2])/[(
2
1),( cKIbKKIG tttt −=  
bc
K
Ib
I
G
tt
−





=





∂
∂
          (11) 
Inserting (11) into (9) we get: 
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Substituting (11a) and (12) into (10) we get: 
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Assuming that the marginal products of variable factors (∂F/∂L) can be replaced from the 
first order conditions by (w/αp), we do not need to have a parametric form for the production 
function.  
Substituting (9a) and (13) back into (5a) and setting λt and λt+1 equal to zero gives the 
following empirical Euler equation under the null hypothesis of no financial frictions:  
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where )1/()1( 11 δρφ −+= ++ tt  with 1)/)(1( 111 −+= +++ tttt pprρ  being the real discount rate, 
(CF/K)t=(ptYt - wtLt)/(ptKt) is the ratio of real cash flow to the capital stock. 
]})1/[()1(1){/( 1 IttIttItt prpppJ +−−= + δ is the user cost of capital, Yt = Ft - Gt is net output and Vt+1 
is an error term.  
Equation (14) is the standard Euler equation that is used in the literature for testing financing 
constraints in the presence of only one type of investment asset in the portfolio of the firm. However, 
if the financialization hypothesis is correct, then the availability of alternative forms of investments 
and their rates of returns will need to be included in the investment function of the firm. In theory, if 
we assume that the rt is equal to the rate of return on financial investments, equation (14) implicitly 
includes the impact of the profitability of financial investments through the discount rate that the firm 
uses in discounting its future dividends. Thus the higher the rate of return on alternative (i.e. 
financial) investments, the higher the opportunity cost and therefore the discount rate of fixed 
investment projects. This will eventually lead to lower net present value of fixed investment projects, 
and thus to lower investment spending.  
We can further highlight the differences in firms’ portfolio allocation decisions and their 
reactions to ensuing profits from different investments using a modified version of the model by Le 
and Zak (2006). Our simplified portfolio model includes a large number of identical agents living in 
a developing country where they consume their returns from wealth invested in one-period 
investment projects in fixed (i.e. factories) or financial assets (i.e. T-bills).  For simplicity there is 
only one type of investment in each type of assets that can be considered as a portfolio of multiple 
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investment assets (i.e. machinery, building etc for fixed assets; and T-bills, stocks, bonds and foreign 
exchange assets for the financial assets). We also assume a single homogenous good produced, and 
the immobile population is normalized to one with a zero growth rate.  
Let Itk be fixed investment assets at time t with a rate of return rtk. Investment in fixed assets is 
risky, ),(~ 2σµNr k .  Agents can also invest Itf in financial assets with a risk-free time-invariant rate of 
return rf (that is equal to riskless rate of return on financial assets such as 3-month U.S. T-bills and is 
equivalent to rt in equation (14)). This can also be interpreted as riskless financial asset return plus 
exchange rate risk and country risk. Both types of investments are undertaken at the beginning of time t 
using the initial wealth of W0. The standard maximization by a representative firm of the expected utility 
from such investments gives us:  
∑
∞
=0
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t
t
t
W
WUEMax
t
β          (15) 
subject to: 
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t
fk
t
k
tt IrIrW )1()1( +++=         (16) 
where U(W) is strictly increasing, continuous and concave.  
 To save space, we refer to Huang and Litzenberger (1988) and Le and Zak (2006) for a derivation 
of this standard portfolio choice model. Using (15) and (16) and applying the Stein’s Lemma5 the 
optimum allocation equation becomes:  
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I
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−
=           (17) 
taking natural logs yields:  
))(ln(ln))(ln()ln( * ktfktkt rVarrrEI −−−= γ        (18) 
                                                 
5
 That is Cov(g(x), y) = E (g’(x))Cov(x, y).  
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where )( ktrVar  is the variance of the rate of return on fixed investments that is interpreted as economic 
uncertainty, and )])([/)]([( ''' tt WUEWUE−≡γ  is the risk aversion that is assumed to be constant. (18) 
suggests that fixed investments increases as a) rate of return on fixed assets (that is operating profitability) 
increase, and/or rate of return on financial assets (i.e. financial asset profitability) decrease, and b) 
economic uncertainty decreases. 
 We can incorporate (17) into the complete version of firm’s optimal investment path given by 
(14) via separating operating profits from financial profits. This would also enable us to compare our 
results with the previous work that used the Euler equation approach without separating the source of 
profits and their respective rates of returns, which we discuss in the next section. 
4.1 Empirical Testing 
Following equation (14) the presence of financing constraints is then tested by the following 
reduced form specification for each country separately:   
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where dt and fi are time and firm specific effects correspondingly with subscripts i and t referring to 
the firm and time period. Under the null hypothesis of no financial frictions, β1 > 1, β2 < -1, 03 ≥β  
(given that Y/K controls for imperfect competition given ∞<< ε1  and would be eliminated from 
the above equation under perfect competition), and β4 < 0. In this specification, if we find β4 > 0 that 
is increasing cash flow has a positive effect on investment, the firm is assumed to be financially 
constrained. Similar to Bond and Meghir (1994) and Leaven (2003) we drop the user cost of capital 
from the empirical specification given complications in its measurement.  
Besides testing for financial frictions, we also test whether cash flow from different types of 
assets (and their rates of returns) have different effects on fixed investment decisions. Accordingly, 
based on the portfolio choice model we contend that in the presence of multiple investment options, 
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the sign on β4 might be indeterminate. In particular, as argued by Tornell (1990) given the uncertain 
environment in developing countries, real sector firms may prefer to invest in more liquid reversible 
assets (If) in the financial sectors that also offer comparable or higher rates of return on their 
investments rather than on irreversible fixed assets (Ikt) (as suggested by (18)). If this is the case real 
sector firms may have financial investments (Ift) that is positively related to the risk-free interest rate, 
which is positively related to the external borrowing cost.  
Therefore, the measurement of cash flow can make a significant difference especially given 
the lack of any consensus regarding its calculation in the empirical literature. In fact, the construction 
of cash flow variable in investment equations varies without any consistent approach to what 
constitutes available internal funds for fixed investment. The data availability rather than theory 
seems to be the dictating rule. While in some cases net profits are used as cash flow, in others 
operating profit or operating profit plus depreciation, or some other measure is used. Eisner (1978), 
for example, adopted net profits after depreciation as cash flow measure while Bond and Meghir 
(1994) defined cash flow as operating profits before tax, plus depreciation provision, plus interest 
and preference dividends. Likewise, Leaven (2003) used operating income plus depreciation while 
Mairesse, Hall, and Mulkay (1999) experimented with both cash flow and operating profit where 
cash flow is defined as operating income plus net financial profits, plus net extraordinary items, 
minus taxes.6  
Given the endogenous nature of portfolio allocation decision, what the previous research 
omitted in the measurement of cash flow is the interdependent relationship between fixed and 
financial capital. As a result, when measured by financial rather than operating profits the coefficient 
β4 may have a positive or negative sign (or the same sign but different magnitudes) depending on the 
                                                 
6
 Bond and Devereux (1990), and Edwards, Kay, and Mayer (1987) discuss in detail several points 
researchers need to be aware of when using firm balance sheet data for economic analysis.  
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impact of profits from financial investments on fixed investments especially if there are any frictions 
within the firm between different departments in charge of investment planning. Thus, we may get a 
negative sign not because of a lack of financial frictions but because of a possible negative 
relationship between financial profits and fixed investment decisions to the extent that increasing 
financial profits signal increasing rates of return on financial assets while raising the discount rate in 
equation (14). Or in the opposite case (i.e financial profits having a positive effect), we may conclude 
that financial investments are used as a hedging mechanism and as such have a welfare enhancing 
effect in developing countries. Yet, even then we may have differential economic impacts depending 
on the source of profits and departments in charge of decision making within the firm. In both cases, 
however, if there are no internal frictions within the firm we expect to find a positive relationship 
between cash flow variables and fixed investment once controlled for their respective rates of returns.  
In addition to testing for financial frictions and differential impacts of cash flow from 
different sources, we also separated expected profitability rates from cash flow by looking at the 
effects of the profitability of different types of investments. If both financial and operational 
profitability variables (measured by respective rates of return) have a positive impact on new fixed 
investment decisions, this may suggest that real sector firms use financial investments as a hedging 
mechanism against uncertainties in the market and use expected profits from such activities the same 
as from operational activities despite a higher discount rate in equation (14). However, if we fail to 
find a positive relationship between rates of return on financial investments and fixed investment 
spending, this will imply that high return alternative investments in non-operational activities may 
result in a low-level equilibrium with lower fixed investment rates.  
4.2. Estimation 
In the estimation, the financial profits variable is measured as the realized financial income 
net of financial expenses except interest cost. Namely, it includes dividend income from subsidiaries 
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and affiliates plus interest income and other dividends, plus net gain from foreign exchange 
transactions, plus other income from other operations (such as from financial derivatives) net of 
losses and expenses from such operations. The operational profits are defined as net-operating 
revenues minus cost of goods sold, minus operating expenses.  The financial assets include current 
assets (cash, bank deposits, etc.) and short-term investments (stocks, treasury bills, bonds, repo, etc.), 
while net fixed assets include all existing fixed capital stock net of land and depreciation.  A detailed 
discussion of the variables is presented in the appendix.  For simplification we have re-written 
equation (19) as follows:  
itittititititi vfdCFKOIII ++++++= −−−− 1,41,32 1,21,1, ββββ
     (20) 
where Iit  is measured as the real net fixed investment of firm i in year t and is measured by the 
logarithmic difference of net fixed capital stock at constant prices ( itk∆ ).7 
(Y/K)it is measured with the capital-output ratio (i.e. KO that is the inverse of Y/K) and 
measures the presence of imperfect competition as well as the assumption that output and capital are 
proportional. Hence, a decreasing KO ratio is expected to increase new investment. Also, the lag in 
the response of investment spending to capital/output ratio result from the role of expectations given 
that new investment depends on expected future sales which themselves rely on current and past 
sales, and adjustments costs and delivery lags (Abel and Blanchard, 1986).  
CFit is a set of cash flow and profitability variables reflecting the effects of the availability of 
internal funds as well as expectations about future profitability and opportunity cost of fixed 
investment and includes: a) current and lagged ratios of financial and operational profits to beginning 
capital stock (FK and OK
 
respectively), which capture the effects of financial and liquidity 
                                                 
7 δ−≅∆≅∆+==∆
−−−− 1,1,1,1, //]/1log[]/log[ tiittiittiittiitit KIKKKKKKk  
where δ is the depreciation rate, and log is the natural log.   
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constraints as well as of the cash flow from financial investments and, b) rates of return on fixed (rk) 
and financial (rf) assets where the latter captures not only the market signals regarding future 
profitability in non-real sector activities but also the effects of opportunity costs. 
The novelty introduced here is to look at different components of profits when analysing their 
effects on Iit. If Modigliani and Miller (1958) is correct, cash flow should not have any effect on 
fixed investment decisions.  On the other hand, in the presence of capital market imperfections all 
previous research assumed that overall profitability has a uniform effect on investment decisions 
independent of its subcomponents since the primary source of profits is presumed to be operational 
activities. In other words, for a real sector firm operational profits and rk is assumed to have the same 
positive effect on fixed investment as financial profits and rf. However, the sign on financial 
profitability measure is in fact indeterminate: a positive operational profits (including rk) and 
financial profits (including rf) coefficient would suggest that financial constraints are important and 
both profit variables have the same positive effect on investment decisions.  If this is the case, then 
financial investments by real sectors firms will indeed have a positive impact on capital accumulation 
by providing fresh funds even during times of high volatility or uncertainty. If, however, we found a 
positive operational profits (OK) and rk, and a negative financial profits variable (FK) and rf, this 
would suggest that a short-term distortion might have long-term consequences by inducing 
deindustrialisation in developing countries. In other words, if increasing profits from financial 
investments are not used for financing real investments, then we may have a low-level equilibrium 
where firms engage in more and more non-real sector activities without contributing to fixed capital 
formation. To the extent that the rate of return on financial assets reflects the opportunity cost of 
fixed investment as well as future profitability of such assets, it is expected to have a negative 
coefficient. 
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5. Data and Methodology 
5.1. Data 
The datasets are from the audited financial accounts of publicly traded industrial firms and 
are unbalanced. The period analysed is biannual and cover 1990:2-2003:2 for Mexico and 1993:1-
2003:2 for Turkey. The primary reason for using biannual data is to capture the effects of sudden 
changes in profitability and risk conditions in the market on the investment positions of the firms 
(especially regarding financial investments and profits). Given the highly liquid nature of short-term 
financial investments, annual end-of-year values would be highly biased in presenting the changes in 
both stock and flow values of financial assets and profits during the year.   
The firm level data for Mexico mostly came from Economatica, a commercial database 
providing financial statement data for publicly traded Latin American companies.8  For Turkey the 
data were obtained from the Istanbul Stock Exchange Market online database. In some cases 
Worldscope International, Datastream, and original firm financial statements are also used for 
robustness and completeness. We have eliminated those firms with less than 8 consecutive periods 
from the dataset as well some extreme outliers. In the case of Mexico, there are 79 firms in the final 
dataset with 63 in manufacturing (ISIC 15-37), 4 in mining (ISIC 10,12,13,14) and 12 in construction 
(ISIC 45). For Turkey, there are 172 firms all in manufacturing (ISIC 15-37). A description of the 
data and measurement issues are provided in the appendix with summary statistics (Table 4). 
5.2. Methodology 
The datasets consist of non-random stock market quoted firms, which may receive market 
listing only if they satisfy certain conditions. Therefore, in order to correct for parameter endogeneity 
resulting from the presence of unobserved firm-fixed effects as well as to correct for the correlation 
                                                 
8
 There are certain problems with the Economatica database that researchers need to be aware of. An 
appendix including a detailed list of problems is available from the author upon request. 
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between the lagged Iit and firm specific effects and the error term, we used a Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991)’s first differencing transformation that is 
widely applied to have a consistent estimate for dynamic panel equations. Accordingly, we apply the 
following first-difference transformation using Arelano and Bond (1991) GMM estimation. The first 
differencing is assumed to remove the individual firm-specific effects while the GMM estimation 
corrects for any remaining endogeneity as well as the correlation between ∆vit and ∆yit: 
itititit vxyy ∆+∆+∆=∆ − '1 βα             (21) 
In this transformation, if xit is serially uncorrelated then xi,t-s will be uncorrelated with xit* for  
s ≥ 2. This means that if the error term in the investment equation is serially uncorrelated, lagged 
values of the transformed (or untransformed) dependent variable9 and other right-hand side variables 
dating t-s will be uncorrelated with the transformed error term as long as s ≥ 2.  As discussed by 
Bond and Meghir (1994, p.210), remote lags are not likely to provide much additional information 
and therefore we did not include all moment restrictions in our calculations (we used 32 ≤≤ t lagged 
values of right hand side variables and time dummies at levels as instruments10). The validity of the 
instruments and the estimation are tested by two specification-tests as suggested by Arellano and 
Bond (1991). The first one is the Sargan-test of over-identifying restrictions for testing the validity of 
instruments used. The second one is the usual m2 test that is a second-order serial-correlation test of 
the residuals from the first-difference equation. The reason for this is that the use of endogenous t-2 
dated variables is valid only if there is no serial correlation in the error term of order 2.  
 
                                                 
9
 On this issue, see e.g. Greene (1997, p.641). 
10
 In the GMM estimation, the White period based on Arellano and Bond (1991) 2-step method is 
used for GMM weighting matrices. The reported coefficient covariances are robust and corrected 
using White (1980) period weights from final iteration.  
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6. Results 
The results from Table 1 shows that investment is not following the functional form in (14) 
given that neither β1 nor β2 follow the projected investment paths. β3, on the other hand, appeared 
with the expected sign at statistically significant levels in both Mexico and Turkey.   
<Insert Table 1 here> 
When looking at the cash flow variables (β4), we see that the results both confirm and to some 
extent challenge the initial hypothesis. Accordingly, in the case of Mexico a negative relationship is 
found between current financial profits and fixed investment spending at a significant level. In 
contrast, the current and lagged operational profits variable is found to be significantly positive 
suggesting the presence of capital market imperfections in line with others. When looking at the 
lagged values of financial profits we found it to be positive although with a much weaker economic 
effect compared to the operational profits variable. Furthermore, when analyzing the joint effect of 
current and past values of financial and operational profits, we found a negative and insignificant 
overall effect of FKt and FKt-1 as revealed by the sum of the coefficients and a positive effect of OKt 
and OKt-1.  
In the case of Turkey, however, we found a positive relationship between both current and 
past financial profits and fixed investment spending as implicitly assumed by the previous research. 
Similarly, the current and past operational profits variables are also found to have a significantly 
positive effect on new fixed investments as in Mexico suggesting the presence of capital market 
imperfections. Comparatively speaking, however, the joint effect of current and past financial profits 
is found to be four and a half times smaller than the operational profits.   
 The results suggest that financial profits do actually have different effects on new investment 
decisions of real sector firms compared to operational profits, especially with respect to current 
period cash flow variables. Yet, financial profits also appeared to provide a hedging mechanism by 
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providing additional cash flow in the subsequent periods as shown by the positive coefficient on the 
lagged FK variable. In both cases, the positive economic effect seems to be much smaller than the 
one on OK and is indeed negative on a net basis in Mexico.  
The reason for the positive financial profits variable in Turkey may be the fact that financial 
profits as well as financial investments account for a larger share of the profit and capital structure of 
Turkish firms than Mexican counterparts. Accordingly, as of 2001 the financial revenues to net 
profits ratio was 547 with an average of 112 between 1990 and 2002 for the top 500 manufacturing 
firms (ISO).  According to our sample too, the mean financial profits to net sales ratio appears to be 
fluctuating from around 10% to as high as 65% with sudden jumps during times of financial crisis 
and turmoil. Also, comparatively Turkey has a higher financial assets (If/K) and FKit ratios compared 
to Mexico (Table 4).  
In addition, we also examined the effects of profitability expectations as measured by the past 
rates of returns on fixed and financial assets (i.e. rkt-1 and rft-1 respectively). The question we asked is 
apart from releasing financial constraints, whether increasing cash flow also signals the firm’s future 
investment opportunities and therefore affect the results in Table 1. The results in Table 2 show that 
in Mexico past rates of return on financial assets have a significantly negative effect on current 
period’s fixed investment spending. In contrast, the rate of return on fixed assets is found to have a 
significantly positive effect.  On the other hand, in the case of Turkey both variables appeared with a 
positive sign suggesting that expected financial investment profitability has the same effect on fixed 
investment spending as the profitability of real sector activities. A closer look, however, reveals that 
the size of rf is 480 times smaller than the rk, suggesting significant economic differences in their 
respective effects on fixed investment spending.  
Nevertheless, if there are no frictions within the firm that prevent resource pooling (i.e. 
separate departments in charge of fixed and financial investment decisions), there is no reason why a 
particular firm cannot pull all of its cash flow from real and financial sector activities together and 
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reallocate the aggregate cash flow to investments in different types of assets. If this is the case, then 
the coefficient on financial profits variable in Table 1 may be reflecting only the differential impacts 
of the rates of return on fixed and financial assets. Therefore, once controlled for the rate of return on 
financial assets, the cash flow from financial investments may be expected to have the same sign as 
those from real sector operations. In column (3) of Table 2 we checked for this possibility by 
controlling the effects of rates of return on financial assets when re-examining the effects of cash 
flow.  The results show that once controlled for the negative effect of rates of return on financial 
assets, the cash flow from financial investments have a robust positive effect in both countries.  
<Insert Table 2 here> 
Moreover, in order to see if there are any differences between small and large firms in their 
investment response to financial and operational profits, we have divided the sample into two using 
firm size based on the median sales in the sample. We then constructed a small-firm dummy that 
took the value of one if real net sales at time t were smaller than the sample median. Consistent with 
Gelos and Werner (2002) and Leaven (2003) the results from Table 3 suggest that large firms in both 
Mexico and Turkey faced an increasing credit squeeze during the 1990s as shown by their higher 
sensitivity of fixed investment to operational profits. In other words, large firms are found to be more 
dependent on internal funds than small firms that may be due to the elimination of directed credits 
after financial liberalization. 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
We also found that increasing financial profits have a larger fixed-investment depressing 
effect in large Mexican firms. In fact, financial profits appear to have a positive effect on fixed 
investment spending of small Mexican firms. Similarly, in the case of Turkey, financial profits have 
a more positive effect on fixed investment spending of small firms.  We can offer two contesting  
arguments to explain such differences between small and large firms in both countries: a) the effect 
of financial profits on fixed investment may be smaller for large firms since they already had better 
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diversification of their investment portfolios prior to financial liberalization; or b) while small firms 
use cash flow from financial investments as an extra source of internal funding, large firms utilize 
such profits for acquiring new financial investments (given their better access to different investment 
options) to the extent they reflect increasing opportunity cost of real sector activities.  The fact that 
financial profits actually have a negative coefficient for large Mexican firms provides more support 
to the second explanation, which suggests that large firms are less likely to use profits from such 
investments to finance fixed investment projects. 
7. Conclusion 
The financial liberalization wave of the 1990s and the following integration of global capital 
markets opened new venues for portfolio diversification of real sector firms including the possibility 
to invest in non-real sector activities such as those in financial markets. Given this observation, the 
current paper revisited the capital market imperfections debate using some of the insights of portfolio 
theory of capital and the financialization view. Accordingly, we have tested the impacts of 
financialization of real sectors of the economy as well as the persistence of capital market 
imperfections in two major emerging markets after financial liberalization. The empirical results 
using firm level data confirm the findings of other papers by showing the persistence of credit 
constraints for real sector firms. In addition, the key contribution of this paper has been to show that 
in the presence of multiple investment options the availability of internal funds is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for financing fixed investments. Accordingly, the source of funds is as much 
important as the availability of funds themselves given the differential impacts of profits from fixed 
and financial assets in our results. Although in theory the increasing share of financial assets in the 
portfolios of real sector firms may play a positive role in hedging risks and increasing profitability 
and therefore in increasing overall efficiency, our results provide little support for this.  
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 Accordingly, the reason why we may find a negative or insignificant cash flow variable in 
reduced form investment equations is not so much because of a lack of capital market imperfections 
but because of the measurement of the cash flow itself. Furthermore, given the availability of 
countless investment opportunities in the financial markets, the results suggest that empirical 
investment modelling should control for the portfolio choice problem of real sector firms. In this era 
of financial globalization, we may as well see an increase in the number of real sector firms whose 
primary activity is to engage in financial investments not limited to hedging concerns.  
 Key policy recommendations of this paper to increase real investment rates in emerging 
markets include: a) elimination of capital market imperfections and opening up of long-term credit 
channels for fixed investment projects, b) providing macro and microeconomic stability that helps 
reduce market volatility and increase planning horizons of real sector firms, c) reducing real interest 
rates that not only depresses real investment and credit availability but also lures firms to engage in 
riskless financial investments.  
 For further research, in order to see if the above findings are limited to Mexico and Turkey 
we need to repeat the analysis with other developing countries as well despite certain problems 
regarding data availability. Secondly, applying this analysis to developed countries would help 
clarify any possible differences in the reactions of developed and developing country real sector 
firms to financial liberalization and emergence of multiple investment options outside real sector 
activities. 
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Appendix 
1. Measurement Issues and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)  
1.1. Measurement under Mexican GAAP 
 Since 1984 Mexican GAAP requires firms to apply inflation accounting in balance sheets and 
income statements to correct for the effects of inflation. As a result of the price-level inflation 
accounting system, average Consumer Price Index (INPC) is used in calculating biannual values for 
each period. In converting to real prices, Producer Price Index (INPP) period average is used for net 
sales, operational profits, net profits before taxes and financial profits in the income statements, while 
INPP end-of-period values are used for net fixed and financial assets in the balance sheets. The 
manufacturing firms in the dataset represent 36% of total manufacturing sales in 2003.   
1.2. Measurement under Turkish GAAP 
For Turkish manufacturing firms, in converting to real prices, end of period manufacturing 
price index is used for financial and fixed assets in the balance sheets while for  net sales, operational 
profits, and financial profits in the income statements manufacturing price index period averages are 
used. The firms in the dataset account for 22% of total manufacturing sales in 2003.   
2. Data Definitions and Sources 
FAit: Financial Assets represents end of period financial assets the firm holds and includes 
current assets (cash, bank deposits, other current assets, cheques) and short-term investments (stocks, 
treasury bills, government bonds, private sector bonds, REPO and other short term investments).  
FKit: FPit/Ki,t-1 
FPit: Financial Profits.  
If/Kit: FAit / (FAit + Kit) 
Kit: Net Fixed Assets.  
KOit: Capital-output ratio measured as Kt-1(beginning fixed capital stock)/net sales.  
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OKit: Operating Profits/Ki,t-1 
rkit: Rate of Return on Fixed Assets measured as end of period operational profits (calculated 
as net sales minus cost of goods sold minus operating expenses) divided by net fixed assets (using the 
average of period beginning and ending net fixed assets as the denominator).  
rfit: Rate of Return on Financial Assets calculated as FPit/ FAit (period averages).  
2.1. Mexican firm level variables   
All data are converted to fixed prices using the INPP at 2003 December prices from Banco de 
Mexico.  
FAit: Includes cash, short-term investments, and investment in other companies. In the 
company accounts, the investments in other companies (not affiliates) are restated for inflation 
(based on INPC) and recorded at current prices. The sum is expected to reflect total marketable and 
liquid monetary assets held by the firms.   
FPit: Includes net foreign exchange gain, financial income, and income from other financial 
operations. The income (net) from other financial operations includes gains (losses) from marketable 
securities and short term investments, profits (losses) from selling of shares on other companies, etc.  
Kit: Includes net property, plant and equipment together and land given that land is not 
disclosed separately in the Economatica database. The data are at replacement cost till 1997 and at 
current prices since then. During the estimation, several methods, which are available from the author 
upon request, are applied to test for the consistency of this variable because of the change in its 
measurement.  
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2.2. Turkish firm level variables  
All data are converted to fixed prices using Manufacturing Price Index at 1995 January prices 
from the Central Bank of Turkey.   
FAit: Includes current assets (cash, bank deposits, other current assets, cheques) and short-
term investments (stocks, treasury bills, government bonds, private sector bonds, REPO and other 
short term investments). We did not include long-term financial fixed assets in other firms given that 
under Turkish GAAP the long-term financial fixed assets are recorded at historical cost.   
FPit: Includes dividend income from subsidiaries and affiliates plus interest income and other 
dividends, plus other income from other operations, net of losses and expenses from other operations.  
Other income from other operations account included gains from foreign exchange fluctuations as 
well as other types of income such as from swaps etc.   
Kit: Includes all existing capital stock net of depreciation excluding land (which is not subject 
to depreciation and is recorded at historical cost without revaluation).  
 
<Insert Table 4 here> 
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Figure 1: Operating Profitability 
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Note: Operating profitability is the operating profits to net sales ratio.  
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Figure 2: Financial Assets vs. Operating Profits Volatility 
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Note: Financial assets variable is the share of financial assets in total financial and fixed assets. 
Operating profits volatility is defined as the t -/+2 moving standard deviation of operating profits at 
constant prices. 
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Table 1: Fixed Investment and Cash-flow Relationship Revisited 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the Iit from equation (20). It-1 is net fixed investment by firm i at time t-1, KO is capital-output ratio 
measured as inverse of Y/K, FK and OK are financial profits and operational profits to capital stock ratios. All regressions include a set of 
(unreported) time dummies. Sargan is Sargan-test for overidentifying restrictions. m1 and m2 are is first and second-order serial correlation 
tests. Standard Errors (in parenthesis) are heteroskedasticity consistent. (***), (**), (*) refer to significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level 
respectively. 
 
 Mexico Turkey 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
It-1 -0.241*** -0.25*** -0.238*** -0.212*** -0.23*** -0.213*** -0.086*** -0.091*** -0.091*** -0.073*** -0.095*** -0.078*** 
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
I2t-1 0.014 0.020** 0.029* 0.012 0.015 0.017 -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.018*** -0.01*** 
 (0.014) (0.009) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
KOt-1 -0.043*** -0.048*** -0.047 -0.038*** -0.04*** -0.037*** -0.074*** -0.076*** -0.077*** -0.06*** -0.051*** -0.051*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
FKt -0.05***  -0.05    0.01***  0.004***    
 (0.024)  (0.05)    (0.001)  (0.001)    
FKt-1  0.015* 0.008     0.013*** 0.012***    
  (0.008) (0.036)     (0.001) (0.001)    
OKt    0.149***  0.121***    0.045***  0.05*** 
    (0.028)  (0.047)    (0.002)  (0.003) 
OKt-1     0.059 0.066***     0.033*** 0.022*** 
     (0.041) (0.024)     (0.001) (0.001) 
             
sargan 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 1 
m1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
m2 0.944 0.944 0.83 0.807 0.864 0.846 0.362 0.352 0.351 0.317 0.341 0.321 
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Table 2: Rates of Return and Fixed Investment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: rkt and rft are the rates of return on fixed and financial assets. For other variables refer to Table 
1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mexico 
  
Turkey   
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
It-1 -0.223*** -0.233*** -0.239*** -0.073* -0.077*** -0.082*** 
 (0.021 (0.021) (0.021) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
I2t-1 0.013 0.03 0.033 -0.007** -0.012*** -0.011*** 
 (0.013) (0.024) (0.021) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
KOt-1 -0.039*** -0.044*** -0.046*** -0.042* -0.067*** -0.074*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
rkt-1 0.109***   0.048*   
 (0.035)   (0.002)   
rft-1  -0.004*** -0.004***  0.0001*** -0.0001 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.00003) (0.0001) 
FKt-1   0.036   0.006*** 
   (0.038)   (0.001) 
       
sargan 1 1 1 0.999 0.999 1 
m1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
m2 0.864 0.907 0.911 0.289 0.311 0.302 
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Table 3: Fixed Investment and Cash-flow Relationship  in Small versus Large Firms  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: For variable definitions refer to Table 1. Dsmall is a size dummy that takes that takes the value 
of one if net sales at time t are smaller than the sample median.  
 
Mexico  Turkey  
 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
It-1 -0.244*** -0.242*** -0.102*** -0.098*** 
 
(0.024) (0.023) (0.004) (0.003) 
I2t-1 0.018 0.015 -0.019*** -0.008*** 
 
(0.018) (0.015) (0.004) (0.002) 
KOt-1 -0.043*** -0.046*** -0.065*** -0.08*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
OKt-1 0.189*  0.043***  
 
(0.101)  (0.002)  
(OK*DSmall)t-1  -0.045  -0.019***  
  
(0.077)  (0.003)  
FKt-1  -0.054  0.009*** 
 
 (0.124)  (0.001) 
(FK*DSmall)t-1  0.122  0.007*** 
 
 (0.125)  (0.001) 
 
    
sargan 1 1 1 1 
m1 0 0 0 0 
m2 0.748 0.896 0.352 0.378 
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Table4: Summary Statistics 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: I is net fixed investment, KO is capital-output ratio OK is operational profits to capital stock 
ratio, FK is financial profits to capital stock ratio, rk and rf are rates of returns to fixed and financial 
assets, If/K is the financial assets to financial assets plus net fixed assets ratio.   
  
 
Mexico I KO OK FK rk rf If/K 
 Mean 0.012 1.963 0.110 0.015 0.107 -0.242 14.328 
 Median -0.001 1.568 0.071 0.004 0.071 0.037 8.041 
 Maximum 2.150 16.561 4.589 3.936 3.377 11.018 92.120 
 Minimum -1.289 0.032 -2.323 -1.304 -2.387 -22.415 0.075 
 Std. Dev. 0.238 1.602 0.302 0.171 0.278 1.779 17.490 
Turkey I KO OK FK rk rf If/K 
 Mean 0.013 0.607 0.492 0.244 0.530 1.532 0.211 
 Median -0.002 0.421 0.297 0.077 0.328 0.385 0.145 
 Maximum 2.176 8.545 8.402 14.564 8.053 92.684 0.926 
 Minimum -2.554 0.005 -5.252 -4.696 -5.153 -53.798 0.000 
 Std. Dev. 0.255 0.658 0.773 0.808 0.754 6.725 0.197 
 
